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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GERTRUDE H. SNYDER, 
l'laintijf and Respondent, 
vs. 
ROBI~~RT JAMES CLUNE and 
ROY M. STOKES, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 9936 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND ·OF CASE 
·This is an action for personal injuries alleged to 
have been received in an automobile accident on a 
public highway in Utah County, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendants moved the lower court to dismiss 
the action on the grounds that the Complaint of 
plaintiff was barred by the Statute of Limitations. 
The lower court denied the motion. Appellants then 
petitioned this court for an Intermediate appeal 
\Yhich was granted. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
.-\ppellants ask that the Order of the lower court 
denying their motion to dismiss be reversed and 
that the action be dismissed. 
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STATEMENT ·OF F A:CTS 
The followin·g facts are apparent from the 
record or were agreed to by counsel at the 'hearing 
on appeTlants' motion to dismiss. 
1. This is an action for personal injuries al-
leged to have occurred in an automobile accident on 
a public highway in /Utah County, Utah, on Decem-
ber 14, 1958. 
2. Defendants and Appellants are not resi-
dents of the State of 'Utah, but reside in the State 
of Californ1ia, and as far is known have not been 
in the State of Utah since the ·happening of this 
accident. 
3. It is conceded by plaintiff that defendants 
and appellants, Robert James Clune and Roy M. 
Stokes, could have 'been served with process at any 
time since the happening of this accident on Decem-
ber 14, 1958, by serving the Secretary of State of 
Utah, under the provisions of the Utah N on-Resi-
dent Motor Vehicle Act (41-12-8 UCA 1943). 
4. Plaintiff filed the Complaint in question 
(Civil No. 24751) in the office of the Utah County 
Clerk on December 17, 1962- four years and three 
days after the happening of the accident. 
5. Plaintiff filed an earlier complaint in the 
office of the Utah County Clerk (Civil No. 24555) 
on December 13, 1961. Summons was not issued 
on this complaint and, in fact, no action whatever 
was taken by plaintiff after filing the complaint. 
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Based on the obvious failure to file timely, de-
fendants and appellan·ts moved the court to dismiss 
the complaint upon the grounds that the four years 
Statute of Limitations had expired. At the hearing 
on the argument plain~tiff raised three points which 
she alleges are a complete answer to her £ailure to 
file within the period limited by s'tatute. ·These are: 
1. That the filing on December 17, 1962 was 
timely because of an intervenin;g weekend during 
which time the office of 'the Utah ·County ~clerk was 
legally closed. 
2. That plaintiff filed !an action arising out 
of this accident for these injuries on December 13, 
1961 in Utah County ('Ciivil No. 24!5;5'5) on which 
no action was taken, but which plaintiff claims had 
the effect of e~tending the time for filing for one 
year from December 13, 196'2. 
3. That the absence of defendants from the 
State of U·tah tolled the running of the Statute of 
Lin1itations and, therefore, plaJintiff's action is 
timely. 
Defendants urge that neither of plaintiff's 
arguments are sufficient and that the lower court 
erred in denying defendants' motion to dismiss and 
show this by further consideration of the points 
raised by plaintiff. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF'S C·OMPLAINT OF DECE'MBER 17, 
1962 ('SEC'OND ~CTIO'N) WAS NOT FILED TIMELY. 
THE F01UR-YE'.NR STATUTE OF L:UMITA·TIONS HAD 
RUN. 
The plaintiff argues that at all events the filing 
of the second cause of action 'on December 17, 1962 
was 'timely and within ~he Four-Year Statute of 
Limitations because December 14, t962 was a Fri-
day ~and that she, therefore, could file on the follow-
ing Monday (December 17, 1962) and 'stil~ be with-
in the Four-Year Statute. 
Time properly computed under our statute will 
show th·at plaintiff's con'tenti'on is not sound. Com-
putation of 'time is codified by our statute, Title 
68-2-7 U'CA 19'53. The statute rea~ds: 
'·'Time, how computed. - The time in which 
any act provided by law is to be done is com-
puted by excludling the first day 1and includ-
ing the last, unl~ss the last is a holiday, and 
then it also is ·excluded.'' 
The next succeeding section, ·68-3-8, makes pro-
visions for acts that must be done on a particular 
day which fal'ls upon ~a holiday. 'This section of the 
statute reads. 
"When a day appointed is a holiday.- When-
ever any ·act of a secular nature, other than 
'a work of necessity or mercy, 1is appointed by 
law or contract to be performed upon a par-
ticular day, which day falls upon a holiday, 
such act may be performed upon the · next 
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succeeding business day with the same effect 
as if it had been performed upon the day ap-
pointed." 
To the san1e effect is Rule 6(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rule provides: 
~'Rule 6 Time (a) COMPUTA'TION. In com-
puting any period of time prescribed or allow-
ed by these rules, by order of court, or by any 
applicable statute, the day of the act, event 
or default after which the deslign1ated period 
of time begins to run is not to be included. 
The last day of the period so computed is to 
be included, unless it is a Sunday or a legal 
holiday, in which event the period runs until 
the end of the next day which is neither a 
Sunday nor a holiday. When 'the period of 
time prescribed or allowed is less th~an seven 
days, intermediate Sundays and holidays shall 
'be excluded in the computation. A h.alf holi-
day shall be con·sidered as dther days and not 
as a holiday." 
Plaintiff's cause of action accrued on December 
1-!, 1958. That is the date of the accident as set forth 
in plaintiff's complaint. That is the d·ate on which 
plaintiff's right to commence an ~action came into 
exiStence. The Four-Year Statute of Limitations ·ap-
plicable to tort actions would run against the claim 
of plaintiff on December 14, 1962, at the end of 
that day. 
Computing the Four-Year Statute of Limita-
tions under the lime statute and the Rules of Civil 
Procedure, we see that December 14, 1H58, the day 
the action accrued, is excluded and December 14, 
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1962, a full four years thereafter, is included. 
Plaintiff's action had to be commenced on or 
before December 14, 19'H2 in order to toll the Sta-
tute of IJimitations. Filing thereafter was too late. 
Plaintiff argues, however, that she 'had until the 
following day in which to file her complaint and 
that the following day was a Saturday and th~at the 
office of the Utah County Clerk was legally closed 
on that day and the next day W1as also 'a legal holi-
day and, therefore, she had until December 17, 1962 
in whiCh to file timely. 
'Since the Statute of Lim'itations expired on 
December 14, 1962, a Friday and not a holi1day, 
pl1aintiff'1s argumen't is without merit. 
Two Utah cases will illustrate 'these principles. 
In the case of Nelson vs. Jorgenson, '242 P. 945 
(Utah) an action was filed on a judgment, which 
judgment had been entered on October 15, 1914. The 
complaint in this case was filed October 16, 1922. 
It would appear that the complaint of '0ctdber 16, 
192'2 wa1s filed one day a·fter th·e Statute had run. 
However, tilie court held: 
"It is conceded that October 15, 1922 was a 
Sunday. The complaint alleges that the ori-
ginal judgment was obtained and entered in 
the District 1Couit of Salt Lake County on 
Octo'ber 15, 1'914. 'Section 5843 of Comp. Laws 
Utah 1917 provides th~at the time in which 
any act ·provided by law is to 'be done is com-
puted by excluding the first day and includ-
'fng the 'last, unl'ess the last day is 'a holiday, 
and then it 'is also exclu~ded. Was the action 
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barred by the foregoing provisions of our Sta-
tute on the fifteenth day of October, 1922? 
The language of the statute would se·em to 
answer the question in the negative. 
This case illustrates two points. First, the Eight-
\" ear Statute would have run eight years to the day 
after the entry of judgment. In the case at bar, the 
statute would 1·un four years to the d~ay after the 
happening of the accident; namely, December 14, 
1962. Second, that since the last day, or October 15, 
1922, was a holiday, the complaint was timely filed 
on the following day. In the case at bar, December 
14, 1962, was a Friday; and, hence, our case and 
the Jorgenson case are distinguishable. In the case 
of: In Re Lynch's Estate, 2'54 P. 2·d 4·54 (Utah), 
a motion to 1amend the judgment was denied on 
November '22, 1952. Notice of Appeal was not filed 
until December 23, 1952. The Court stated and held: 
"Appellan1t contends that by excluding Nov-
ember 2·2, the day of the act or event from 
which the period of one month commences to 
run, her time commenced to run on November 
23, and that one month after November 23 
giYes ·her all day of Decem~ber 23, the day 
when the Notice of Appeal was filed. With 
this reasoning, we do not agree. 
·'In the present case, we exclude from our 
calculations the day of the act or event after 
which the designated period of time begins to 
run, which is November 22, the day on which 
the motion was overruled, and start counting 
from the beginning of the twenty-third of that 
month; from that time, one month would end 
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at the expiration of the 22nd day of Decem-
ber, or ju~st before the 2·3rd commenced, which 
marked the beginnin·g of another month. To 
hold in accord·ance with appellant's argument 
would require an overlapping of one day into 
the next month and a longer period or greater 
number of days than the month in question 
contains.'' 
Fol'lowing the reasoning of In Re Lynch, to 
permit pla'intiff to file on November 17, 1962 would 
require .an overlapping of one day into the nex't year, 
which is ~a period longer than that permitted by the 
S·tatute of Limitations. 
P·OINT II. 
PLAI·NTI;FF''S AC·TI'ON FILED DEiCEMB'ER 13, 
19'61, DID NO·T EXTEND THE TIME FO'R FJ:LING HER 
SECOND A1CTION. 
Plaintiff filed an earlier ·Complaint in the Dis-
trict Court ('Civil No. 24'5'5'5) for identical injuries 
arising out of the identical :accid€nt of December 14, 
1958. 1That 'Complaint was filed December 1'3, 1961. 
No action whatever was taken after the Complaint 
wa~s filed. ·This action failed other th1an on 'fue merits 
by the provisions of Rule 4. (b). 'This rule reads: 
"Time of issuance of service. If an action is 
commenced by 'the fil'ing of a Complaint, Sum-
mons must issue thereon within three months 
from the date of such filing. The Summons 
must be served within one year after the fil-
ing of the Complaint or the ~action will be 
deemed dismissed, . . . '' 
Since Summons was not issued on this Com-
plaint within lthe three months provided by the Rule, 
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the action failed on March 13, 1961, three months 
after the filing of the Complaint. Thus, the first 
action of plaintiff failed on March 13, 19'6'2; how-
ever, the Statute of Limitationis had not run on 
plaintiff's claim ·and plaintiff still had until Decem-
ber 14, 1962, in which to file a second action. This 
was not done, however, until December 17, 1962. 
Even if the Court were to 1hold that plaintiff's first 
action had not failed until one year after it was 
filed on December 13, 19'61, plaintiff still had until 
December 14, 1962 in which to file the second action 
before the lim'ita:tions statute would 'bar the claim. 
Plaintiff :argues, however, that the failure of 
the first a'ction otherwise than on the merits had 
the effect of extending the time to file a second 
action for a period of one year. To support this con-
tention, plain tilff relies on the provi1si'ons of Ti tie 
78-12-40 U·CA 1953; we quote this statute, 
"If any action is commenced within due time 
and a judgment thereon for the plaintiff is 
reversed, or if the plain-tjiff fails in such 
action or upon a cause of ~action otherwise 
than upon the merits, and the time limited 
either by law or contract for commencing the 
same shall have expired, plaintiff, or if he 
dies and the cause of action survives, his rep-
resentatives, may commence a new action 
within on·e year after the reversal or failure.'' 
(Italics supplied) 
The statute is clear in stating tha:t 'the time 
limited for the commencement of the ·action must 
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have ex·pired before the statute has ·any application. 
Plaintiff's first action failed on March 13, 1'962, or 
at the latest on December 13, 1962. After the failure 
of the first cause of action, plaintiff still had 'to and 
including December 14, 1962 to commence the second 
action. H·aving failed to do so, her cause of action 
is 'barred. 
A 1simi1lar savings statute 'has been interpreted 
by the Oklahoma courts in Birmingham Fire Insur-
ance Company v. Bond, 301 P. 2d 861 ('Okla.). The 
Court sta:ted and held: 
'·~The filing of said former action of April 8, 
194'9, did not h:ave the effect of extending the 
period of limitations by invoking the applica-
tion of 12 O.'S. 1941, Sec. 100. \The one-year 
period in which the ·action could be filed did 
no't expire until January 26, 1950. 'Therefore, 
the filing ·and dismissal of the first action 
several months previously in no way extended 
the time. The Rule was first announced by 
this Court in the case of Engl'ish v. 'T. H. 
Rogers Lu·mber Comp1any, 68 Okla. 238, 173 
P. 1046 104'7, wherein it was held that, 
~The statute giving to a plain 'tiff the right 
to commence a new action within one 
year after the reversal or failure of his 
original ~action was not intended to af-
ford in all cases an ·additional time in 
wHich to bring suit. By its terms 'the 
tight i's conditioned upon the fact tfiat 
"the tim·e limited for the same shall have 
expired." 'Th·at is, but for the statute, 
plaintiff's action would, at the time of 
10 
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the failure or reversal be barred by the 
statute of lin1itation. Such is not the case 
when the failure occurs !at a time when 
the plaintiff has full opportunity to com-
mence a new action.' " 
'The U~tah statute is to the same effect. If the 
reversal or :£ailure occurs after the statute of limi-
tations h·a;s run, then the plaintiff has an additional 
year in which to file a new action. However, if the 
statute has not run on the date of the reversal or 
failure, then the statute has no application. In this 
case, the Four-Year Statute of Limitations expired 
December 14, 1962. Plaintiff's first action £ailed 
March 13, 1962, for failure to issue Summons; and 
even if it were held that the action failed December 
13, 1962, for failure to serve Summons wi'thin one 
year, still plaintiff h·ad to ~and including the four-
teenth day of December 196'2 to file the second ac-
tion. lt must be concluded that the first ·action failed 
before the Statute of Limitations h·ad run ·and, there-
fore, the extension s·tatute relied upon by pl·aintiff 
had no ·application. 
POINT III. 
ABSENCE FROM THE STATE DOES NOT TO'LL 
THE RUNNING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
IN .A NON-RESIDENT 'MOTORIST CASE. 
Plaintiff relies on the provision's of 78-12-35 
UCA 1953, which in substance provides that the 
time a person is absent from the Sta'te of Utah is 
not part of the period of time limited for the com-
mencement of actions. Most juri'sdictions have a 
11 
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statute similar to the Utah statute, the purpose be-
ing to prevent a defendant from defeating a claim 
by ·absenting :him'Self from the State. Here, however, 
plaintiff could h~ave obtained jurisdiction over these 
defendants at anytime after the happening of the 
accident by serving the Secretary of State of Utah. 
This identical problem has been decided by a number 
of jurisdictions, the m!ajority of those holding that 
the a'bS'ence 'Statute has no application to a non-resi-
dent motorist case and that the running of the Sta-
tute of Limitations is not tolled during the al>sence 
of defendant where plaintiff could get personal ser-
vice by serving a statutory ·agent. 
are: 
The ·general rule is ·stated in 17 A.L.R. 2d '516: 
"Where provision is made by statute for sub-
stituted service of process upon a state offi-
cial in caS'es arising out of motor accidents 
within the state, the majority of the courts 
have held th:at such a provision has the effect 
of nullifying any statute suspending the peri-
od of limitations.'' 
Those jurisdictions following the majority rule 
UNITED S'TA'TES.- Tublitz v. Hirsch-
feld (1941, CA2d NY) 118 F2d 29 ·(under 
·Connecticut statute). 
C·ONNECIT'FCU'T.-Coombs v. Darling 
(1'9'33) 116 ·Conn. 653, 166 A 70. 
ILLIN·OIS. - N e l·s on v. Rich1ardson 
( 19'3'8 29'5 Ill. App 504, 15 NE2d 17. 
A'2d 286. 
12 
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TENNESSEE - Arrowood v. McMinn 
County ( 1938) 173 Tenn. 562, 121 SW2d 
5HG, 119 ALR 855. 
VERMONT. - Reed v. Rosen fie 1 d 
(1947) 115 Vt. 76, 51 A2d 189. 
DEL. - Hurwitch v. Adams (Del.) 151 
A.2d 286. 
lOW A. - Kokenge v. Holthaus, 243 
Iowa 571, 52 NW2d 711. 
MO. - Haver v. Bassett, - Mo. App. ____ , 
287 SW2d 342 (citing annotation); Scorza v. 
Deatherage (CA8th Mo.) ·208 F 2d 660. 
N. H. - Bolduc v. Richards (NH) 142 
A2d 156. 
OKLA. - Moore v. Dunh·am (CA lOth 
Okla.) '240 F2d 19'8 (Applying ·Oklahoma sta-
tute). 
MICH. - Hammel v. Bet~ison, 362 Mich. 
396, 107 NW2d 887. 
OR. - Whittington v. Davis (Or.) 3'50 
P2d 913. 
We have selected the ca~se of Moore v. Dunham, 
240 F2d 198, (10 c·cA. Okla.) as indicative of the 
persuasive reasoning of the majority view. 'The 'Court 
said: 
"Oklahoma courts h1ave not construed Section 
98 (absence statute) in connection with the 
provisions for service of process under the 
Non-Resident Motorist Act. But the majority, 
and we think the better reasoned view, holds 
that provisions for substituted service of pro-
cess upon a state official arising out of motor 
accidents within the state has the effect of 
13 
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nullifying any statute suspending the period 
of limitations. ('citing cases) 
":Such view is said to be consi;stent with the 
purpose of substituted service, i.e. expeditious 
adjudication of the rights of parties; that by 
creating substituted service the legislature ob-
viously intended to provide an exception to 
this suspension provisi'on; and that a contrary 
conclusion would permit a plaintiff to defer 
the institution of his action indefinitely to 
the prejudice of the defendant." 
Plaintiff cites th:e Utah case of Keith O'Brien 
Company vs. Snyder, 51 U. 227, 160 P. 9'54, which 
held that where ·a person absent from the state main-
tains ·a residence where process could be served in 
the sta:te, the Statute of Limitations was tolled dur-
ing his ·absence. 
'Th·a;t case was necessarily decided in part on 
our service of process statute which then provided, 
"The Summons must be served by delivering 
a copy thereof as follows: . . . ( 8) In 1all other 
cases to the defendant personally, or by leav-
ing such copy at his usual place of abode with 
some suitalJle persons of at least the age of 
14 years.'' 
The decision of the Keith O'Brien case neces-
s·a:rily involved that phrase of the statute "usual 
place of abode". Service of process at the "usual 
place of abode" is not always effective. In the case 
of Gr,ant v. Lawrence, 108 P. 931 (decided earlier 
than the Keith O'Brien casie) held, in ·an action to 
set ·aside a judgment on the groun·d that no Sum-
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rnons had been served as required by this section, 
\vhcre it appeared that plaintiff, while still married, 
had taken a plural wife and had gone to En'gland 
with her as a mission1ary, during which time his 
first wife had built a house in Salt Lake City with 
money furnished by plaintiff who had never seen 
the house nor lived in it until he returned from 
England; service on plaintiff while he was in Eng-
land by leaving a copy of procesS; at the house of the 
first wife was held insufficient since such house was 
not plaintiff's "usu~al place of abode" within the 
statute. 
We thus see that service rat the "usual place of 
abode" can be uncertain and ineffective to determine 
the rights between parties. A judgment obtained on 
such service could be set aside for want of juris-
diction many years later after substanti1al rights 
of third parties had intervened. 
Two important changes h·ave occurred in our 
law since the decision in the Keith O'Brien case. 
The Non-Resident Motorist Vehicle Act ( 41-
12-8) was passed in 1943. This statute provides in 
part: 
uThe use and operation by a nonresident or 
his agent of ·a motor vehicle upon and over 
the highways of the state of Utah shall be 
deemed an appointment by such nonresident 
of the secretary of state of 'the State of Utah, 
to be his true and lawful attorney upon whom 
may be served all legal processes in ·any ·action 
or proceeding against him growing out of such 
use or operation of a motor vehicle over the 
15 
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highways of this state resulting in damages 
or loss to person or property and said use or 
operation shall be a signification of his agree-
ment th1at any such process shall, in any ac-
tion against him which is so served, be of 
the same legal force and validity as if served 
upon him personally.'' 
In January of 19'50, th~e Rules of Civil Proce-
dure 1amended the Service of Process Provisions of 
the statute and now read as follows: 
"Rule 4. (e) Personal service in this State. 
Personal service within the state shall be as 
follows: 
( 1) Upon a natura;! person of the age 
of fourteen years or over, by delivering a copy 
thereof to him personally, or by leaving such 
copy at ·his usua:l place of abode with some 
person of suitable age and discretion there 
residing; or by delivering a copy to an agent, 
~authorized by appointment or by law to re-
ceive service of process." (Italics supplied) 
The Legislature has provided that service upon 
the S~ecretary of State is personal service and cer-
tainly there can be no uncertainty either in the terms 
of such service or upon the person served. !The Sec-
retary of State is ·a state office where service can be 
had at any time. The problem created by the Grant 
case and recognized by the Keith O'Brien case is 
n·ot present. Rule 4. (e) Specifically recognizes such 
person·al service "by delivering a copy to ·an a~gent 
authorzied by appointment or law to receive service 
of process.'' 
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As in the 1najority rule respecting the absence 
statute in nonresident motorist cases, our Legisla-
ture and courts intended to nullify the a·bsence sta-
tute in non-resident motorist cases. When one con-
siders that the policy of the law in general and the 
non-resident motorist statute in particular, is to 
bring about "expeditious adjudication of the rights 
of parties", the ·application of the Utah 1absence sta-
tute would work an illogical and unjust result. 
'To illustrate, we may consider the plight of a 
Utah motorist who travels in a forei'gn state for the 
first ~and last time and there has an accident. If 
the absence statute of that state were applied, he 
would 'be subject to suit at a time so remote that 
all m'emory of the accident would be erase·d. Clearly, 
he would be prejudiced thereby. 
The situation most nearly resembling the non-
resident motorist case is tha:t of a foreign corpora-
tion having a process agent in the state of Utah. 
Such a corporation is ·a person (legally) ·and is ab-
sent from the state. Does the statute of limita:tions 
ever run on a claim againSt the foreign corporation·? 
This Court said that the Statute did run in the case 
of Clawson vs. Boston Acme Mines Development 
Company 269 P. 147 (Utah). Quoting the general 
rule, the Court said: 
~'The majority of decisions maintain ia rule 
which it is ·believed is more consonant with 
justice. The Rule, briefly stated, is that if, 
under the laws of the domestic state, the cor-
poration has placed itself in such position 
17 
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th·a;t it may be served with process, it may 
:avail itself of the Statute of Limitations when 
sued. Ability to obtain service of proce'Ss is 
the test of the running of 'the Statute of Lim-
itlations." 
The test of whether the Statute of Limitations 
will run is the ability 'to obtain service of process. 
That is the Utah Rule applied to qualifying foreign 
corporation'S and should be the rule in 'the ca'se of 
a non-resident motorist. The foreign corporation 
and th~e non-resident motorist s·tand on the same 
footing ·as re'gards their absence from the state and 
stand on the same footing as regards service of pro-
cess. Just as a qualifying foreign corporation must 
1appnint a process agent, the non-resident motorist 
·appoints the S~ecretary of State his ·agent for the 
·purpose of 'service of process by operating a vehicle 
on 'the public highways of this state. 
To hold that 'the Absence Statute applies to 
non-resident motorists on the authority of the Keith 
O'Brien case (supra) on the one bland ·and then to 
hold th·at it does not apply to ·a foreign corporation 
on the authority on the Clawson case (supra) on 
the other hand, would reach results diametrically 
opposed on identical legal principles. 
Appellants urge that 'the rule ado·pted by the 
majority of jurisdictions as regards the Absence 
Statute in non-resident m·otorists cases, be adopted 
by this 'Court. It is ·a rule founded on l~ogic and reason 
·and is squarely 1aligned with the Utah Rule on quali-
fying foreign corporations which the non-resident 
motorist case is most closely ·akin. 
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CONCLUSION 
1. Plaintiff's action filed December 17, 1962, 
for injuries received December 14, 1958, was not 
timely. The Statute of Limitations had run on De-
cember 14, 1962. 
2. The action filed by plaintiff (the identical 
accident and injuries) on December 13, 1961, failed 
because summons was not issued within three months 
and did not have the effect of extending the filing 
period for one year because the time limited for 
filing had not expired on the date the action failed. 
3. The Utah absence statute has no applica-
tion to a non-resident motorist case where jurisdic-
tion can be obtained at any time by service of pro-
cess on the Secretary of State. 
For the reasons set forth above, the action of 
plaintiff is barred by the four year Statute of Limi-
tations. The order of the district court must be re-
versed and the action of plaintiff dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & GARRETT 
Attorneys for 
Defendants and Appellants 
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